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Evaluating the role of partnership in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy: the Eastern neighbourhood 
 






After recent enlargements, the EU sought to develop a new strategy that would 
incentivise rather than compel, in the absence of a membership prospect, the 
neighbours for reform. The concept of partnership was placed on the agenda as 
a supplementary tool of EU governance to offset negative externalities of 
convergence and compliance. However, it has taken the EU three conceptual 
iterations to finally identify a suitable frame for engagement. This paper posits 
that the EU is currently at a critical juncture observing an important shift in its 
modus operandi – away from hierarchical coordination and control, to more 
networked relations of self-censorship and ownership, designed to operate 
through a complex matrix of grass-root initiatives to penetrate all levels of 
society. To make it an effective model for the future external relations, the EU 
still requires two important elements – institutionalisation of the new 
governance structure, and learning about ‘the other’, to mobilise partners’ 
support for reciprocal and sustainable cooperation.   
 





The 2004 & 2007 enlargements have had a profound effect on the 
European Union (EU) as a polity. Not only did they alter the EU’s geographical, 
political and socio-economic landscapes, making it the third largest population 
in the world after China and India.1 More fundamentally, they forced a 
reassessment of the EU’s way of thinking regarding its frontiers, and its role vis-
à-vis its external environment. Excluding the Balkan region, the EU acquired 
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sixteen new neighbours in the South and the East, which were as culturally 
diverse, as they were different in their levels of GDP and political stability. 
Therefore, how to frame relations  with its immediate neighbourhood – bearing 
in mind the EU’s ambitions to develop into a “real global player” (Prodi, 2002, 
p. 2) – became one of the most pressing issues for the EU at the time, also 
precipitating discussion of inclusion, resource capability and borders.  
The toolbox of strategies for EU external relations until recently, had 
been rather unsophisticated and heavily relied on the direct governance 
framework with hierarchy and conditionality being at its heart. Essentially, 
pertaining to degrees of geographical proximity, these included the enlargement 
strategy and aid relations with third world countries. 
The enlargement strategy has proven rather effective in modelling EU 
external relations with its immediate neighbours, often being referred to as 
“unarguably the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument” 
(Commission 2003, p. 5). Premised on strict conditionality and top-down rule 
transfer,2 with EU membership serving as a ‘golden carrot’ for compliance, this 
instrument, however, on its own, would have had limited relevance and 
applicability to the territories “seen as separate from the question of EU 
accession” (ibidem).  
At the other end of the spectrum - and at a distance - the EU has also 
enjoyed a proven track-record of aid cooperation with third world countries yet 
again premised on strict conditionality but not necessarily demanding full 
convergence with the vast body of EU acquis. This model of EU relations with 
the outside too would have proven less satisfactory to ensure ‘good 
neighbourhood’, for which it was not the only aid provider or indeed a ‘pole of 
attraction’, and which did not have a carrot of membership either.  
Nevertheless, alignment by the neighbours with EU norms and 
regulations – acquis communautaire – was regarded as strategically important 
for the EU, to ensure stability, prosperity and security on its periphery, and to 
increase its influence internationally (European Security Strategy, 2003). Hence, 
developing a credible and effective framework of engagement with the 
neighbourhood region (especially eastwards) became a critical priority for the 
EU.  
While striding through a number of conceptual iterations and competing 
visions,3 the EU sought to offer a more flexible approach to the neighbours – 
“more than partnership and less than membership” (Prodi, 2002, p. 4) - which 
would preserve its right for coordination/control, but also safeguard local interest 
                                                     
2 This approach is referred here as ‘external governance’, and is premised on hierarchy, 
involuntary compliance and disciplinary engagement in the process of adoption of EU 
acquis communautaire by the outsiders.  
3 For more elaborate discussion of the competing visions of the ENP by the Commission, 
the European Parliament, and the Council see Korosteleva 2012, Introduction. 
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and ownership. Hence, from the start, the principles of differentiation, 
interdependence (Commission, 2003, pp. 2-6), and reciprocity “when the two 
sides are clear about the mutual advantages and the mutual obligations” (Prodi 
2002, p. 4) were directly embedded in the EU discourse of relations with the 
neighbours. Furthermore, the new framework also aspired to bring neighbours as 
“close to the Union as it can be without being a member”, especially those who 
“wish[ed] to implement further reforms… in building their capacity to align with 
and implement parts of the acquis communautaire” (Commission, 2003, p. 10).4 
Additionally, a benchmark approach was identified to supplement traditional 
conditionality to ensure, where possible, ‘national ownership and commitment’ 
(ibidem, p. 16). In a nutshell, the new strategy envisaged an increasing role for 
partnership as an incentivising concept, to complement the EU’s traditional 
approach of coordination and control – governance – in the neighbourhood.  
By 2004, the concept of partnership was firmly on the agenda generally 
referred to as “the privileged relationship with neighbours” (Commission, 2004, 
p. 3). However in terms of its substantive underpinnings it remained surprisingly 
hazy. Conceptually, it was conceived as distinctive but supplementary to the 
traditional governance approach, “building on existing policies and 
arrangements” (Commission, 2003, p. 15). Methodologically, the separation was 
even less clear cut. Benchmarking in the finalised Strategy Paper (Commission, 
2004) and subsequent official documents was replaced by conditionality as a 
driver for reform: “The ENP is based on the same kind of conditionality which 
we had already used to promote reform [during enlargement]” (Landaburu, 
2006, p. 3). Furthermore, the design of policy instruments (Action Plans and 
assistance instruments) to a considerable degree replicated those used under the 
enlargement process (Tulmets, 2011); whereas the Commission’s personnel 
were almost entirely staffed by those with prior experience of formal 
enlargement (Kelley, 2006).    
Consequently, by 2006/7 the EU’s partnership-building with neighbours 
vividly stagnated becoming rhetorically driven, and in the light of neighbours’ 
reluctance to reform under the rigid hierarchical framework of governance, had 
to be substantially revisited to make the ENP stronger and more appealing for 
the partner countries (Commission, 2007). Thereafter, references to partnership 
in EU official documents noticeably increased, leading to the development of 
new regional partnership initiatives in 2008 – the Union for the Mediterranean in 
the South and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in the East. The EU also expanded 
its engagement to all levels of society (e.g. Civil Society Forum) thus moving 
further towards more networked and seemingly more effective relationships of 
‘self-censorship’ and ‘local ownership’. These developments consequently raise 
a number of important questions explicitly alluding to the role of partnership in 
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EU relations with neighbours. In particular, one would posit whether the concept 
of partnership has finally assumed its centrality in the EU’s discourse and 
practice in the neighbourhood; and if so, what consequences and potentially new 
dynamics this would entail for the EU traditional governance5 framework? What 
are the principal features of the EU’s new modus operandi under the EaP, and 
what implications this might have for the promotion of the EU’s image as a 
“credible force for good” (Solana, 2007) in the region and globally? 
These and other questions are examined in this article focusing on the 
evolution of partnership as an important concept and practice (to make EU 
governance work), and its role in EU relations with the (eastern) neighbours.6 
The article will proceed as follows. First, the nature and role of partnership as a 
concept in IR and in EU external relations will briefly be defined and juxtaposed 
against the governance framework. It will be suggested that partnership, 
although considered crucial for developing a more flexible approach to the 
neighbourhood to offset the rigidity of EU governance, was not initially 
prominent on the agenda. In the second section we will examine the EU’s 2nd 
generation policy, the Eastern Partnership, launched in 2008 as ‘a more 
ambitious’ and focused regional instrument of EU governance in the east. It will 
be demonstrated that whilst partnership has gradually assumed more 
prominence, it still remains deficient of its intended impact. In the final section, 
and by way of conclusion, we will explore the EU reflexive attempts to propel 
the notion of partnership, after its 3rd iteration (Commission, 2011), to its proper 
meaning engaging all levels of society in a complex matrix of networked 
interactions. It will be contended that partnership, nevertheless, still omits a core 
element – the EU’s understanding and inclusion of the other into the partnership 
formula.  
 
2. Defining partnership in IR 
Partnership as a concept in IR has proved to be as elusive to “realize as 
to analyse” (Milner, 1992, p. 466). Scholars nevertheless agree to define it as 
occurring “when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated 
                                                     
5 Governance here is interpreted as a system of coordination and control signifying both 
structure and process whereby the former relates to the institutions and actor 
constellations, while the latter reflects modes/ways of coordination/control by which 
actors adjust their behaviour (Börzel, 2010, p. 194). EU external governance more 
specifically implies top-down rule-transfer and conditionality to assure partner countries’ 
convergence with the body of EU regulations and norms – acquis communautaire (for 
more discussion see Korosteleva, 2012 - chapter 2; Lavenex, 2004, 2009; Börzel, 2010; 
Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006). 
6 Although the concept of partnership in its earlier iterations will be discussed with 
reference to the ENP as a whole, its actual practice and evolution thereafter will be 
traced by focusing on the eastern dimension only. 
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preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination” (Keohane, in 
Milner, 1992:467; Oye, 1986; Alexrod, 1984; Grieco, 1990). For partnership to 
occur actors should employ with two elements: first, they should align their 
strategies to achieve mutual goals; and second, that such cooperation should 
entail mutual gains or rewards for the participating sides. “The gains need not be 
the same in magnitude or kind for each state, but they are mutual” (Milner, 1992, 
p. 468). Partnership, therefore, presupposes both a process whereby each set of 
actors learn about the other as well as the adjustment of each set of actors 
behaviours to suit the other, and the outcome should lead to the joint ownership 
of goals and benefits. 
There also seems to be a general scholarly consensus regarding the 
strategies by which partnership may be achieved. Oft-cited instances include the 
strategy of reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 1986), iteration hypothesis 
(Axelrod, 1984; Snidal, 1991) and international regimes hypothesis (Krasner, 
1991).  
The strategy of reciprocity is of particular relevance to the analysis of 
EU relations with neighbours.  As Keohane contends, reciprocity refers to: 
 
...exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each 
party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a way that 
good is returned for good, and bad for bad. These exchanges are often, 
but not necessarily, mutually beneficial; they may be based on self-
interest as well as on shared concepts of rights and obligations; and the 
value of what is exchanged may or may not be comparable (Keohane, 
1986, p. 8, italics original). 
 
Reciprocity may be specific entailing immediate trade-offs, or diffuse, 
anticipating long-term benefits engendered through joint commitments and 
mutual trust. In order for diffuse reciprocity to take effect, specific reciprocity 
should prove beneficial. Such a consequential relationship is more likely to 
generate trust and commitment, based on mutual experience as a result of 
recurrent or expanding forms of cooperation, and may lead to more intensified 
exchanges in the future, in anticipation of long-term gains. This dialectic of 
specific and diffuse reciprocity is instructive in the sense that it explicates the 
formation of the virtuous circle of trust in partnerships: the relationship driven 
primarily by self-interest of participating sides progresses from initially 
experiencing immediate revenues to eventually assuring commitment to the 
pursuance of shared goals. In relation to the EU partnership approach in the 
neighbourhood, tangible benefits are essential to initiate cooperation; however, 
in order to induce a long-term relationship, developing a reciprocal sense of 
commitment to mutual goals and gains, is essential. 
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The iteration hypothesis, in turn, acknowledges the importance of 
continuing cooperation, and partners’ awareness of their determinate future. It 
argues that effectiveness of cooperation is influenced by the future certainty of 
their relationship: “the more heavily the future is discounted, the less likely is 
cooperation” (Milner, 1992, p. 474).  
The international regime hypothesis, in turn, recognises the relevance of 
specific functions that international organisations may perform to imbue best 
practices and uphold the rules of the game (Keohane, 1986; Abrahamsen, 2004; 
Nappini, 2005; Wilkins, 2012). In the context of EU external relations, it is 
certainly the EU who should take the lead, but should do so in a manner 
whereby reciprocity and learning are adequately maintained. 
In summary, partnership in IR recognises the importance of equivalence 
in partners’ behaviour, as well as reciprocity with pertinent rule/incentive 
structures and determinate future to imbue sustainable cooperation. Hence, in 
order to be effective, partnership presumes both a learning process about 
partners’ needs and preferences, as well as an anticipated outcome, which may 
initially be driven by self-interest and eventually shaped by joint commitment to 
the assured future of mutual benefits and goals. 
 
3. The concept of partnership in the ENP: 1st generation  
As originally stated, partnership is as difficult to realize, as to qualify. 
As the EU’s experience with third countries has proven, partnerships often 
become “more illusion than reality (Fowler, 1998, p. 137), and signify many ‘big 
ideas” (Crawford, 2003, p. 139) but have little substance to draw upon. Indeed, 
in the words of a senior External Action Service official, ‘the EU does not have 
a fixed, but an evolving meaning of “partnership”, also deploying different 
meanings for different parties’7. This instrumental rather than substantive use of 
partnership has also been corroborated by ENP officials in framing relations 
with the neighbours, implying that partnership is merely ‘a means to an end’, an 
‘instrument for co-opting partner countries’ in the process of convergence with 
the EU.8  
In the light of this instrumental utility of partnership in EU external 
relations, a three-type taxonomy of the concept vis-à-vis the EU traditional 
governance framework may generally be discerned: (i) partnership as 
subordinate to EU governance best exemplified by EU aid relations with third 
countries; (ii) partnership as supplementary to EU governance framework, as 
conceived for the neighbourhood, and finally, (iii) partnership as autonomous of 
governance, as illustrated by EU strategic partnerships with key international 
players (i.e. the US, Russia, China). While partnerships in EU aid relations 
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largely remain ‘externally driven, shaped and influenced by international 
agencies, in contrast to a sovereign process where national actors direct and 
control a reform programme, which is then implemented jointly as a shared goal 
by internal and external actors’ (Crawford 2003, p. 143), as is envisaged in the 
case of the ENP; strategic partnerships imply more balanced and interest-driven 
relations of equivalence and generally adhere to mutual principles of game-
keeping (Grevi and Vasconcelos, 2008). 
As noted earlier, the concept of partnership in the ENP seems to occupy 
the middle ground on the partnership-governance nexus. It was conceived to 
supplement the EU’s existing arrangements with the third countries (governance 
framework), but also to develop its own apparatus9 to offset the deficiencies of 
hierarchical governance, and aid the implementation of mutual goals and the 
maximisation of mutual gains.  
There seems to be, at least on a discourse level,10 an important 
conceptual shift to view partnership not merely as an additional instrument to 
enforce unquestionable compliance in the process of transference of EU rules 
and norms (as is in EU aid relations with third countries). In the new iteration, 
partnership has essentially begun to designate an act of negotiated or deliberated 
compliance supplementary to the hierarchical mode of governance, thus 
affording some forum for joint decision-making, in this way bringing ‘the other’ 
into the equation. In this case, the EU’s traditional acquis-approach to third 
countries under the ENP, at least in theory, now envisages more room for 
reciprocal measures and joint initiatives to ensure motivated and sustainable 
cooperation between the parties.     
Nevertheless, this conceptual ‘in-betweenness’11 of partnership as a 
supplementary instrument of governance – that is, no longer serving as a 
governance tool, but not yet a fully autonomous framework either – deployed to 
make EU coordination and control more credible for the neighbourhood, has 
added little utility to the concept and its realisation. In real terms, the concept of 
partnership, in the earlier pronouncements of the ENP, remained poorly defined, 





                                                     
9 This not only refers to the method of benchmarking, which is non-binding and partner-
conscious, but also to the partnership’s instruments of joint ownership and shared values. 
10 One has to note that the EU rhetoric does not often coincide with practice: this was 
particularly instructive in the early iterations of the ENP policy in relation to the notion 
of ‘partnership’. 
11 For more discussion on the ‘in-betweenness’ and ‘undecidedness’ of EU foreign 
policy, see Bulley (2009). 
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3.1. Definition 
Essentially the notion of partnership was propelled into the EU discourse 
by what was perceived to be an obvious asymmetry of power relations between 
the EU and candidate countries during the enlargement process (Lynch, 2004; 
Grabbe, 2006; Kelley, 2006; Smith, 2005). Hence, with the launch of the ENP, 
the partnership’s mission was to reconcile potential asymmetries and to placate 
the prospect of partners’ discontent with EU top-down governance, by offering 
them stake in the process of agenda setting and in the form of reform outcomes. 
Although the concept of partnership remained scantily defined in the earlier 
versions of the ENP, its meaning received some elaboration with the launch of 
the partnership’s instruments – of joint ownership, mutual responsibilities and 
shared values – which were put in place to facilitate motivation and commitment 
on the neighbours’ side.  
 
3.2. Controversy 
These new instruments, especially of ‘shared values’ and ‘joint 
ownership’, however, brought more controversy than they offered prospective 
utility. In particular, while ‘shared values’ were often used interchangeably with 
‘common values’ in the EU official discourse, thus causing etymological 
confusion,12 their actual meaning also precipitated a discussion of ownership. 
The resultant ‘whose values’ debate posited whether ‘shared values’ should be 
EU-owned, internationally based (then raising a question of EU exclusivity as a 
club, Tonra, 2010) or indeed jointly gestated. This acknowledged the plurality of 
normative discourses and forced the concept permanently onto the EU 
democracy promotion agenda (Sadiki, 2004; Kurki, 2010; Youngs, 2010). 
Essentially, it questioned the unilateral right and legitimacy of EU governance in 
third countries, whose relationship with the EU was explicitly devoid of a 
membership prospect.13  
Joint ownership, as another constitutive instrument of partnership, in the 
early ENP documents, built on the implicit understanding of ‘shared values’. It 
contended that it was not only the outcome but the actual process of partnership-
building that should equally satisfy all parties concerned:  
 
Joint ownership of the process, based on the awareness of shared values 
and common interests, is essential. The EU does not seek to impose 
priorities or conditions on its partners. The Action Plans depend, for their 
success, on the clear recognition of mutual interests… There can be no 
                                                     
12 ‘Shared’ essentially implies ‘having ownership’, while ‘common’ means ‘often 
occurring’. 
13 For more discussion of this see Korosteleva, 2012, chapter 1. 
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question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities. 
These will be defined by common consent… (Commission, 2004, p. 8). 
 
Many scholars (Sasse, 2008; Nikolov, 2008; Kelley, 2006) however 
noted ‘the inherent tension’ between joint ownership and conditionality 
highlighting that ‘joint ownership emphasized the (potential) equality in the 
relationship’, whereas the ENP remained “inherently unilateral [as] was 
epitomized by the highly specific conditionality [of the Action Plans]” (Cremona 
and Hillion, 2006, p. 21).  
 
3.3. Practice 
In the light of the limited transcription of partnership and its instruments, 
the utility of its practice became inhibited and indeed unfit for the purpose of 
fashioning EU governance as a more flexible and credible framework to 
engender partners’ commitment. Consequently, partnership in the EU’s earlier 
interactions with the neighbourhood (2004-07) was ascribed a residual role in 
the process of agenda-setting and reform administration. It was also 
unequivocally regarded by Brussels officials as an instance of governance 
involving ‘projection of our model into the neighbourhood’, and ‘enabling us to 
decide for them and reform them’.14 Relations with neighbours became 
explicitly framed by EU strategic interests and priorities revealed a security-
predicated rationalism of EU rhetoric (Youngs, 2004, p. 421), and driven by 
non-negotiable compliance to fulfil the EU’s objectives: 
  
It was a long overdue recognition that the EU’s interests are tightly bound 
up with developments in its eastern and southern borders and we need 
stable and predictable relationships with our neighbours. In short: if we 
don’t ‘export’ stability, we risk ‘importing’ instability (Ferrero-Waldner, 
2009, p. 2). 
 
The residual view of partnership had not only framed the EU official 
discourse; it affected partners’ perceptions and behaviour too, resulting in their 
criticism of and disengagement with the process (Korosteleva, 2011; Wolczuk, 
2011):  
 
The partnership is rhetoric only. When it comes to real interests, Ukraine 
is critically restrained in choice and ambitions (Member, Party of Reform 
and Order, Kyiv, January 2009). 
                                                     
14 Author’s interview with a senior official, RELEX DDG2 E2, 6 October 2009 
(emphasis added). 
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If partners are equal, they negotiate to reach common grounds. It looks 
like though EU officials have their own explanations for not following 
this rule: they clearly choose partners to their liking (Deputy Minister, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minsk, September 2009). 
 
Of course we are not equal partners, and we should realise and accept 
this! We aspire to become a younger brother, who should look up and 
obey the big brother’s orders (Member, Social Democratic Party, 
Chisinau, December 2008)15. 
 
As the Commission’s assessment report on the implementation of the 
ENP in 2006 expressly indicated, “within each Action Plan, the governance field 
is perhaps the most difficult in which to achieve and measure progress… The 
ambitious reform agendas can only be achieved in the longer haul, and much 
remains to be done” (Commission, 2006, p. 2, p. 6). Partner countries pointed to 
increased pressure and demand from the EU, and insisted on a renewed 
reciprocity and dialogue: “A far more promising position is such that rests on a 
reverse sequence of actions: joint interests first, then these interests will evolve 
into common and even shared values. Only through equal interaction we can 
build shared values: some odd ones will erase, and the shared one will surface” 
(Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, Minsk, 
September 2009).  
In summary, partnership as it had been first gestated under the ENP, 
should have added greater value to the EU governance framework, but owing to 
its insufficient transcription, instead resulted in limited practicable use. In its 
initial reading, partnership appeared to be contradictorily guided by both mutual 
goals/benefits, as in the manner of true partnership, but also demanded partners’ 
allegiances and unconditional commitment to the EU’s rules and norms. The 
structure of incentives offered to the partners, in the absence of a membership 
perspective, was loose and indeterminate, while the instruments used to promote 
governance strongly echoed the enlargement process albeit without a defined 
finality. Devoid of tangible (immediate) benefits of specific reciprocity 
(Keohane, 1986), it is hard to envisage the conversion of long-term promises 
into partners’ commitment to painful reform and the gains of an uncertain future.    
Partnership’s ‘in-betweenness’ or indeed ‘undecidedness’ impelled the 
EU’s reversal to its traditional governance by setting agendas and driving 
convergence through conditionality and rule transfer. This conceptual 
ambivalence of partnership whereby partners’ needs/preferences were ‘heard’ 
                                                     
15 Author’s interviews, ESRC project (RES-061-25-0001). For more information visit 
http://www.aber.ac.uk/en/interpol/research/research-projects/europeanising-securitising-
outsiders/.  
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rather than ‘listened to’, evidently failed to render effective cooperation (Milner, 
1992). Instead it revealed a considerable power imbalance embedded in the EU’s 
developing relations with its neighbours. In 2007 the Commission 
communicated to the European Parliament and the Council, that the ENP should 
become, once more,  a “partnership for reform that offers “more for more”: the 
more deeply a partner engages with the Union, the more fully the Union can 
respond, politically, economically and through financial and technical 
cooperation” (Commission, 2007, p. 2). The Commission identified three 
conceptual areas – differentiation, ownership and regional focus – that needed 
further reinforcement to make EU coordination and control in the 
neighbourhood more effective. Consequently, in 2008, regional partnerships – 
Union for Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) – were proposed, 
with ‘partnership’ as a concept and practice resuming its centrality once again.16   
 
4. The EaP: the 2nd generation of partnership 
Proposed by Polish and Swedish governments, the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) was launched in 2009 having received full official endorsement from all 
27 Member States and 6 partner countries involved. It became “a specific 
Eastern dimension within the European Neighbourhood Policy” (Commission, 
2008a, p. 2), and was unambiguously conceived as “a more ambitious 
partnership between the European Union and the partner countries” (Council, 
2009, p. 5, emphasis original). 
 
4.1. Definition 
Although envisaged to enhance partnership as a concept and practice, 
the EaP’s official documents yet again had fallen short of its proper definition. 
The concept instead was qualified through a number of important referents. 
First, the ‘guiding principle’ of the new relationship with eastern neighbours 
“should be to offer the maximum possible, taking into account political and 
economic realities and the state of reforms of the partner concerned, bringing 
visible benefits for the citizens of each country” (Commission, 2008a, pp. 2-3, 
emphasis added). This corresponds to the strategy of building specific 
reciprocity, through tangible benefits and maximum opportunities for all, 
discussed in the earlier sections. Second, the new relationship should be based 
“on mutual commitments” to a range of principles – from the rule of law, good 
governance etc. to market economy – which in previous iterations were referred 
to as “common values” (Commission, 2004, p. 3). The emphasis on mutual 
commitments short of common values is instructive, as it marks an important 
shift in EU modus operandi - coordination from a distance by conferring 
                                                     
16 From here, the Eastern Partnership will become the prevalent focus of analysis. 
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partners with a stronger sense of commitment and self-censorship for their 
reforms – or what Foucault termed as governmentality (1978). Third, “joint 
ownership is essential, and both sides of the EaP have their responsibilities” 
(Commission, 2008a, p. 3). Once again, the emphasis on responsibility rather 
than ‘shared values’ as hitherto predicated, corroborates the shift in the EU 
governing mode. Finally, it is important to point out that the Commission’s 
communication avoided references to shared/common values altogether, 
whereas the Declaration only mentioned commitment to the principles of 
international law and fundamental values (Commission, 2009, p. 5, emphasis 
added). This altogether may suggest a possible shift towards developing a 
common/flexible ground for partnership-building, and perhaps even less (direct) 
governance from the EU. Alas, this rhetorical move to a more inclusive 
normative lexis has been subsequently vitiated by an explicit stipulation of EU 
values as a foundation for partnership-building with the near abroad, in the 
revised Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Title I, 
Article 8.1:  
 
The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring 
countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good 
neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by 
close and peaceful relations based on cooperation (OJ C 83 30.3.2010, 
emphasis added)17. 
 
In short, although still lacking a proper definition, partnership has 
nevertheless received further renewed momentum with the EaP’s launch as a 
regional and more focused initiative.  In an attempt to make EU governance 
more credible for neighbours, there has also been a critical shift towards less 
direct and hierarchical governance, devolving more responsibility and ownership 
to the participating side, and gradually moving away from the EU-centred 
principled approach, to offer maximum reciprocity, at least on the discourse 
level. 
 
4.2. A complexity of instruments 
The EaP has also rendered a new and complex structure of policy 
instruments and accompanying measures in search of a more accommodating 
approach to the neighbourhood. More specifically, the policy envisaged a novel 
two-track approach of bi- and multi-lateral relations with neighbours – through 
new contractual agreements, joint policy platforms, flagship initiatives and a 
variety of supportive technical and financial instruments – to ensure their closer 
approximation with the EU. 
                                                     
17 Retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/treaty-of-lisbon.aspx?lang=en.  
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The bi-lateral track (BLT) has identified a host of deeper and more 
comprehensive initiatives. First and most importantly, the institutional 
framework of relations has foreseen the upgrading of Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), which have been in place since about mid-
1990s, to more inclusive Association Agreements, to be operationalized through 
annual Association Agendas to ensure their manageability.18 The upgrade should 
also entail the development of:   
- Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs, currently 
under negotiation);  
- Mobility and Security pacts including visa liberalisation and labour mobility 
facilities (under negotiation);  
- Closer cooperation on Energy Security including promotion of partners’ 
membership in the EU Energy Community; 
- Comprehensive institution-building programmes (CIB) to offer capacity-
building support; 
- Support for economic and social policies to reduce regional disparities.  
 
The multi-lateral track (MLT) has, in turn, prioritised inter-regional 
cooperation, to be realised through a range of flagship initiatives and policy 
platforms. As Delcour argues, this dimension was a real innovation in the EU 
external institutional cooperation, as “for the first time, it gathers all six Eastern 
partners and the EU at various levels of representation, and in different arenas” 
(2011, p. 7), and was designed to offer a truly multi-level, inclusive and 
polycentric forum for a partnership dialogue.  
Operationally, the EaP’s multi-lateral track dimension has anticipated a 
complex structure of instruments, engaging all levels of society – from biannual 
meetings of heads of states/government, and responsible ministries through the 
four main thematic platforms down to their specific technical panels operating 
through ad hoc meetings and working groups (Commission, 2008b, p. 9).19 The 
four thematic policy platforms would focus on the issues of democracy and good 
governance (political dimension); economic integration and convergence geared 
towards the establishment of a Neighbourhood Economic Community 
(economic dimension); energy harmonisation and diversification (energy 
security dimension); and finally, contact between people referring to research, 
education and cultural inter-change (socio-cultural dimension). Platforms in turn 
are further broken down into panels to support work on specific issues.20 
                                                     
18 As the practice with Ukraine suggested: narrowing focus to specific and manageable 
targets and monitor them on an annual basis may yield better result and assure 
commitment (Korosteleva, 2012, chapter 4; Langbein and Wolczuk, 2011). 
19 A model similar to the working of the Council of Ministers (involving all levels and 
new comitology structures) in the EU. 
20 For more information see http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/platforms/docs/panel_en.pdf. 
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Furthermore, the MLT objectives should also be advanced through 
selected flagship initiatives “providing visibility and focus to multilateral 
cooperation” (ibidem, p. 12). The Commission proposed five such initiatives, 
comprising integrated border management programme, a Small and Medium-
size Enterprise (SME) facility, regional energy programmes, development of the 
Southern energy corridor,21 and finally, cooperation on natural and man-made 
disasters (PPRDs). 
This operational structure of the EaP’s MLT was to be supplemented by 
a gamut of additional thematic and technical activities co-opting international, 
EU and domestic (as a rule, non-governmental) organisations to ensure all-level 
participation (ibidem). The launch of the following lead-initiatives has been 
planned: Civil Society Forum to facilitate dialogue between civil society 
organisations (CSOs) and public authorities; EuroNest parliamentary assembly 
to develop cooperation between the European and local parliaments; and forum 
between the Committee of the Regions and regional and local authorities. 
The implementation of the EaP’s complex roadmap has been matched 
by the main financial instruments covered by the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI), Macro-financial assistance instrument (MAFI), 
Neighbourhood Investment Facility instrument (NIF), as well as through the co-
option of the International Monetary Fund, European Bank for reconstruction 
and development, and the European Investment Bank, to leverage more 
investment funding. In addition, these financial facilities were to be 
supplemented by a range of thematic, regional and technical policy instruments, 
to ensure inclusive and comprehensive alignment of neighbourhood regional 
practices with those of the EU.22  
In light of the complexity of the emerging policy structure, for the 
implementation of partnership with neighbours, two possible conclusions 
surface. First, the EU appears to be seriously committed to improving its 
engagement with the eastern region, and, as the complex matrix of proposed 
interactions attests to, has now earnestly embarked on a new aggrandizing 
course of partnership-building with neighbours (bottom-up initiatives) to offset 
the rigid requirements of traditional governance, exemplified by negotiations of 
the AAs and DCFTAs. Second, the EU also seems to be gradually changing its 
modus operandi by way of adopting a more networked approach, entailing 
deep(er) penetration of both the political and the social, which clearly marks a 
                                                     
21 This flagship initiative later was placed under the rubrics of the regional energy 
programmes, and replaced by the environmental governance programmes. See 
EuropeAid ‘Update’, 2011. 
22 Examples include European Instrument for Democratic and Human Rights; Instrument 
for Stability; Black Sea Economic Cooperation instrument; INOGATE (energy 
initiative), TRACECA (transport initiative), etc. For more extensive discussion of policy 
instruments for the EU eastern region see Korosteleva et al. (2013). 
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critical juncture in the EU’s approach and understanding of its external 
environment.  
 
4.3. Taking stock of the ambitious plan 
Despite the complex apparatus of the EaP’s expanded resources and 
instruments, the year 2010, however, proved rather challenging for the 
implementation of the ENP in the eastern region. To be sure, the external 
circumstances which swathed the world and Europe into the enduring financial 
and economic crises, topped up by the EU’s post-Lisbon restructuring23 as well 
as the increasing instability in the South – have not been conducive to 
facilitating more attention in the eastern direction, and also required finite 
resources to stay the course. Notwithstanding these developments, the new 
EaP’s structure surprisingly yielded little interest (if anything) or reinvigorated 
sense of commitment on the partners’ side (Commission, 2010). Instead, what 
seems to have rather occurred, is the continued oscillation of Ukraine to the 
East; quiet entanglement of Belarus into the Russian orbit; slow progress of 
reform practice in Moldova and Georgia, and a ready-to-erupt-anew conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan – all showing signs of inertia and 
disengagement with the EU’s stepped up efforts at reform (Korosteleva, 2011, 
2012; Delcour and Duhot, 2011; Raik, 2011; Wolczuk, 2011; Marin, 2011). To 
ensure progress and stability in the eastern region, and to prop up the 
momentum, the EU has recently gone through another cycle of reflection in an 
attempt to offer a more coherent and robust framework for the neighbourhood, 
thus confirming its serious intentions for chose course.   
 
5. A 3rd generation of Partnership & the missing other 
5.1. A complete partnership? 
A more reflexive iteration of the ENP strategy, inclusive of the eastern 
region, thus was communicated by the Commission in May 2011 (Commission, 
2011). The revised version comprised of an extensive set of documents 
encompassing countries’ progress reports, sectoral and regional progress 
overview, and the ENP’s updated medium-term programme. A New Response to 
a changing neighbourhood, as it came to be termed by the Commission 
(ibidem), expressly endorsed partnership as its progressive mode of engagement 
with its near abroad. It once again stressed the underlying principles of 
reciprocity and differentiation of the proposed format of relations to be 
predicated on “greater flexibility and more tailored responses in dealing with 
rapidly evolving partners and reform needs”, as well as “much higher level of 
differentiation allowing each partner country to develop its links with the EU as 
                                                     
23 External Action Service. 
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far as its own aspirations, needs and capacities allow” (ibidem, pp. 1-2). The 
renewed axiom of the framework has become a ‘more for more’ approach, 
contagiously coined by Commissioner Füle in his speech in Baku:  
 
We plan to increase our assistance to the partners based on the so called 
‘more for more’ principle: the more reforms the partners do, the more 
support they get from us. Let me make it clear once again, ‘the more for 
more’ is not for Southern neighbours only. It does not reflect the Arab 
Spring only. It applies to the Eastern partners as well (speech /12/256, 3 
April 2012)24. 
 
The above may suggest that not only the policy instruments and tools of 
engagement in the EU’s approach to the (eastern) neighbourhood are changing; 
the prospects of the future may too: after all, the closer the aspiring neighbours 
will come to the EU’s convergence requirements, the more the EU seems to be 
pledging to offer.25 
The revived partnership formula has also reflected some important new 
developments. Not only does the new discourse tick almost all the boxes for a 
successful partnership-building, as far as the theory goes, by referring to (once 
again) to mutual benefits, mutual accountability, common interests, and shared 
commitment to the universal (rather than the EU’s) values (Commission, 2011, 
p. 2). Additionally, it also insists on increasing cooperation within the Union - 
between Member States and EU institutions – what seems to be a reflexive 
response to the earlier criticism by scholars and practitioners of the EU’s 
disjointed actions, and lack of strategy (Smith and Webber, 2008; Whitman and 
Wolff, 2010; Korosteleva, 2011).  
 
More importantly though, the revisited ENP document explicitly states that: 
The EU does not seek to impose a model or ready-made recipe for 
political reforms, but it will insist that each partner country’s reform 
process reflect a clear commitment to universal values that form the basis 
of our renewed approach. The initiative lies with the partner and EU 
support will be tailored accordingly (Commission, 2011, pp. 2-3). 
Fundamentally, the document corroborates the observed critical shift, at 
least on a discourse level, in the EU’s way of thinking towards its neighbours: 
away from the hierarchical and involuntary governance approach, and closer 
towards more reciprocal and commitment-based relations, predicated on a 
                                                     
24 Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= SPEECH/ 
12/256& format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
25 For more discussion on the finality of convergence in the neighbourhood see Made 
2011, and also research on responses of EU in-country officials to the prospect of 
neighbours’ membership (Korosteleva, 2012). 
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greater sense of motivation, ownership and responsibility on the partners’ side, 
which is further motivated by a ‘more for more’ support from the EU. The EU 
also pledges “to provide mechanisms and instruments fit to deliver these 
objectives” (ibidem, p. 2), and anticipates all-level engagement keeping 
“channels of dialogue open with governments, civil society and other 
stakeholder” (ibidem, p. 3), to which we now turn.26 
 
5.2. A complex matrix of relations 
Indeed, in the light of recent EU activities, roadmaps and initiatives, and 
following the recommendations of the Warsaw Summit (Council, 2011) a new 
and multi-level governance structure of both the ENP and EaP has now become 
apparent. Notably, the ENP structure currently involves three strands of 
initiatives - Deep Democracy, Economic Development and Regional 
Partnerships - each broken down by a number of activities and supported by a 
whole range of policy instruments, including newly conceived tools of the 
European Endowment for Democracy (EED); the ENP for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (ENPAID), which from 2012 covers the eastern neighbourhood 
too; Agreements on Conformity and Acceptance of industrial products (ACAAs) 
as part of the DCFTAs negotiations; the expanded Technical Assistance and 
Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX); the Mobility Partnerships and 
Asylum Pacts including specific Regional Protection Programmes (RPP) for 
Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine (Commission, 2011). The matrix of existing and 
proposed relations is presented below. 
                                                     
26 The signposts of the developing EU’s modus operandi point in the direction of 
governmentality, as Foucault termed it (1978) as a new framework of relations that 
presumes more freedom (of initiative), and ownership on the partners’ side (self-
censorship); as well as closely networked relations between the parties, which entail 
deeper penetration and a prospect of governing from a distance for the EU.   
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Figure 1. The ENP multi-level structure of governance  
 
Source: Commission, 2011 
 
The ENP’s Eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership Initiative, has 
also gained more complexity since its initial launch. The developments in the 
EaP’s bi-lateral track included new Pilot Regional Development Programmes 
(PRDPs), which comes to force from 2012, and was inspired by the EU cohesion 
policy to overcome structural deficiencies and regional disparities.27 The EaP’s 
multi-lateral track has now expanded to mobilise “all strands of society” 
(Commission, 2011, p. 2), from Civil Society Forums (CSFs), and conferences 
of regional and local authorities (CORLEAP), to forums for business interests 
(Sopot) and national parliaments (EuroNest). Technical, thematic and financial 
instruments also abound, often co-opting international stakeholders to ensure 
success, legitimacy and credibility of the EU’s engagement with the eastern 
                                                     
27 For more information see EuropeAid ‘Update on Eastern Partnership implementation’, 
EaP Summit -29-30 September 2011, Warsaw, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/ 
eastern/docs/2011_eap_implementation_en.pdf. For more comprehensive overview also 
see Casier et al. (2013). 
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region. The figure below reflects new and existing configurations of the EU-
neighbours networked relations in the east: 
Figure 2. The EaP multi-level structure of governance 
 
Source: author’s design; EuropeAid, 2011 
 
It is important to bear in mind the newness of the policy which is 
currently developing through both consolidation and growth. Hence while some 
fresh initiatives are still in the stage of development and some slowly coming to 
fruition, one could only make tentative observations and speculate about their 
future progress.  
In the light of the emerging unique structure of the EaP, owing to its 
dual-core approach, it makes possible to draw some comparisons between the 
progress and difficulties that both bi- and multi-lateral tracks of EU interactions 
with neighbours encounter. It appears that the MLT in comparison, despite its 
virtual spatial location and regional differences, seems to have enjoyed a rather 
speedy expansion of its sub-structure, within a short period of time. 
Furthermore, as Delcour (2011, p. 7) contends, the MLT also seems to privilege 
the logic of socialisation instigated by shared learning experiences and practice, 
rather than that of compliance, as is the case of the BLT. Furthermore, joint 
ownership also takes precedence drawing on common interests, self-censorship, 
and reciprocity of goals and gains, as per the earlier discussed partnership 
formula. The MLT gradually becomes to epitomise a networked relationship 
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germinating on a plethora of bottom-up initiatives, between regional/local agents 
vis-à-vis the EU, and is observed to be more effective in terms of committing 
and empowering the partners in the process of cooperation with the EU.  
The MLT as a framework seems to be more propitious for the realisation 
of partnership as a concept within the broader governance framework of the EU: 
it offers forum for discussion and deliberation, it induces a sense of motivation 
and ownership, and also, essentially, offsets negative externalities caused by the 
process of unilateral convergence and EU rule adoption. This way, once properly 
framed, the concept of partnership offers more utility drawing on the bottom-up 
initiatives and more inclusive practices of the MLT.28 The partnership as a 
concept now has gone a full circle, from its initial launch as an idea albeit 
without a shape or form, to its full embeddedness within the policy structure and 
instruments under the ENP and EaP. Now, what about its practice?   
 
5.3. The missing other 
Given the newness of the policy and its intended structure, one could 
only tentatively conclude that partnership, as a concept, may now be on the right 
track. Its practice however needs further understanding, by both sides of the 
partnership nexus. 
Deficiencies are still plentiful. Not only does it seem that the agenda-
setting still is the prerogative of the EU, the practice of relationship as well 
continues to be expressly Eurocentric.  As Laure Delcour observes:  
 
Joint ownership of the policy process is critical for the EaP’s 
multilateral track, which is underpinned by logic of socialisation. 
However, the extent to which this track is jointly owned is questionable 
as the whole process appears to be framed principally by the EU, as a 
general rule, platforms are chaired by the Commission and the EEAS, 
which places the EU at the centre of what currently resembles a hub-and-
spoke rather than a cobweb model of relations (Commission, 2011, p. 11, 
emphasis original). 
 
Furthermore, the practice of partnership on the EU side requires proper 
institutionalisation, to ensure that these regular meetings and forums under the 
CFS, Business, CORLEAP and EuroNest headlines and other relevant events 
will have the force to impact on the decision-making vis-à-vis the neighbours. 
Otherwise, these germinating grass-root initiatives designed to channel up the 
needs and requirements of civil society are likely to stagnate as the unhelpful 
‘talk shop’ and turn into a wasted resource before long.    
                                                     
28 This is particularly relevant for the more reluctant neighbours, like Belarus and 
Azerbaijan. 
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On the other side, an awareness campaign concerning the opportunities 
now available under the EaP amongst the eastern partners is critical, in order to 
properly activate this ‘more for more’ approach, and to ensure continued 
reciprocity in the relationship. Many eastern think-tank representatives observed 
that “we are still walking in the dark, and we need more local knowledge and 
understanding of what we could do for ourselves with the EU’s support” 
(Georgian representative, Bratislava, 12 April 2012). To this end, the 
Commissioner Füle indicated that new roadmaps were underway to be 
individually delivered and discussed at all levels of society with each partner 
country involved.29 This however needs to be buttressed by long-term 
relationship-building to develop a common understanding of available tools and 
joint objectives, to make the partnership work. 
To be succinct, the Eastern partnership has leapfrogged since 2008. 
Being intended as a networked relationship with partner countries, the policy has 
now put in place a vast amount of useful initiatives and resources, supported by 
respective instruments and increasingly articulated through the partnership 
discourse. Their realisation however depends on whether the EU can and is 
willing to learn from the other - the partner countries themselves - which not 
only involves ‘hearing them’, but also ‘listening to’ their needs and concerns, 
and attending to their ideas and suggestions: 
 
If partners are equal, they negotiate to reach common grounds. It looks 
like though EU officials have their own explanations for not following 
this rule: they choose partners who close to their norms, which is fine 
from practical reasons. Foreign policy is however conditioned by national 
interests and should be independent from regime or specificity of any 
government. Interests are not values. As partners we may have different 
potentials, but as independent polities, we are equal, and should be 
treated with respect, which is the basis for a normal and progressive 




In summary, as the above analysis of the evolving role of partnership in 
the ENP/EaP has demonstrated, some considerable progress has been made by 
the EU to develop more accommodating solutions for building strong and 
sustainable relations with its neighbours. By introducing regional partnerships, 
and expanding their remit and policy instruments to allow for more horizontal 
and network interactions, the ENP seems to be gradually gaining pace and 
                                                     
29 Author’s interview, Bratislava, 13 April 2012. 
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legitimacy on the ground, which will be important for assuring its effectiveness 
in achieving the desired outcomes.  
A number of strategic and procedural limitations, however, are still in 
place.  The EU is still grappling with the understanding of a proper definition of 
partnership and occasionally slips into the vicious circle of the unproductive and 
rigid governance approach - of coordination and control through compliance, 
conditionality and top-down rule transference. Conversely, more awareness and 
knowledge of EU intentions is needed by the other side, to engage in reciprocal 
relationship-building. The recently introduced roadmaps for participating partner 
countries should enable better signposting and reciprocal commitment on both 
sides. However, respective institutionalisation of EU practices, and the 
understanding of ‘the other’, including their geopolitical challenges and 
incentives, continue to dominate the agenda, requiring closer engagement by and 
specific reciprocity on the part of the EU, to ascertain once again its leadership 
and attractiveness for the region (Korosteleva et al., 2013). 
As initially contended, in order to be effective, partnership cannot be 
simply supplementary to governance: It should be premised on joint interests 
and gains. It should also involve a process of learning and adjusting to each 
other’s patterned behaviours and practices, which should eventually lead to a 
defined and sustainable future for both the EU and the neighbourhood. If the EU 
wishes to become a “credible force for good” (Solana, 2007), without ‘the other’ 
in the partnership formula - no matter how perfective it may be - EU 
governance, on its own, will not succeed. The Eastern Partnership summit in 
November 2013 will serve as testimony to the growing relationship of 
partnership. The future of this new modus operandi is still full of challenges, 
predicated on the EU leadership and understanding of its relations with the 
eastern region, including Russia as a new leader for the Eurasian economic 
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